Battle of Amritsar
Famous Battle of Chappar Chiri
The battlefield of Chappar Chiri still exists in the present Sahibzada Ajit Singh Nagar district, located near Chandigarh. The Sikhs had built forts near Chappar Chiri in places like Lohgarh, Manauli, Mani Majra, Dakauli, Burail, Dharmgarh, Ramgarh (Butta Singh Wala), and Shatabgarh. Many of these forts are still standing today. These strongholds stored ample food supplies and weapons, some of which were utilised in the Battle of Chappar Chiri. Additionally, weapons were sourced from neighboring villages with large Sikh populations.
Wazir Khan’s anxiety grew following defeats in battles like the loss of Khizar Khan and Sher Muhammed Khan’s two sons at Bahlolpur. Despite receiving reinforcements in the form of soldiers and weapons from Delhi and Lahore, the Mughal army proved unable to suppress the Sikhs. This failure prompted Wazir Khan to suspect that the Sikhs were planning an attack on Sirhind. Wazir Khan sought to catch them off guard by launching a pre-emptive strike away from Sirhind’s territory. He devised a plan to send Ganda Mal, the nephew of Sucha Nand, along with a thousand soldiers disguised as rebels, to join Banda Singh Bahadar’s forces. During the battle, these infiltrators would betray Banda Singh Bahadar and retreat, causing confusion and disarray in the Sikh army.
However, the Sikh intelligence network was superior to the Mughals, and the information about the Mughal plot reached Banda Singh Bahadar in time. With the alert issued to various Sikh units, the Mughal plan was thwarted. The Sikh forces gathered at the ground of Chappar Chiri to intercept the Mughal army, which had begun moving towards Banur, a region with many ponds and a bushy forest.
Banda Singh Bahadur assembled his armies and prepared to attack the Mughal forces at Chappar Chiri. He divided his armies, with one Sikh unit stationed at the adjacent fort Nangal Faigarh. The Sikh army was well-equipped with fifty cannons entrusted to the skilled cannon operator Baaj Singh. The army’s command was entrusted to Baaj Singh, Fateh Singh, Karam Singh, Dharam Singh, Ali Singh and other prominent Sikhs. Banda Singh Bahadar established his base on a hill where he could oversee the situation. According to Khafi Khan, the Sikh army consisted of about thirty to forty thousand soldiers armed with cannons, swords, bayonets, guns, bows, and arrows(Kafi Khan, Muntakhabu-Lubah.).
On 12th May 1710 AD, the Mughal army and the Khalsa forces, led by General Banda Singh Bahadar, engaged in a momentous clash. The Mughals had elephants at the front lines, and the soldiers chanted the war cry of ‘Ya Ali Ya Ali’, to which the Sikh army responded with ‘Akal! Akal’(Ibid).
There is some debate about the actual number of soldiers that Wazir Khan had at his disposal during the battle. While some accounts suggest that he commanded an army of approximately one lakh soldiers, this is widely considered exaggerated. Other sources have reported that Wazir Khan’s forces comprised around five to six thousand horsemen, seven to eight thousand artillerymen, and about eight thousand ghazis, who had joined the fight in the name of ‘holy war’. This would bring the total number of soldiers to around 30,000, which seemed more plausible given the available evidence (Khafi Khan, Muntakhab-ul-Lubab, page II. 653; Elliot, History, VII. 414. The strength of Wazir Khan’s army is given at about 15,000 men of all ranks — ‘five or six thousand horse and seven or eight thousand musketeers (barkandaz) and archers, and with these, some artillery and elephants. Muhammed Harisi, Ibrat Namah, page 41 gives the number as 12,000 and says that they were especially collected for this expedition, while some mention this number as low as seven thousand (Ahwal-i-Salatin-i-Hind page 84), and over three to four thousand (Irvine, Later Mughals, page 95). These may be safely dismissed as incredible. The regular force of Wazir Khan and his four or five faujdar allies was under no circumstances less than 15,000 men as given by Khafi Khan, who would be the last person to give even an exact number of the Muslim force against a non-Muslim. To this may be added the number of the ghazis, 5,000 at the least.).
However, it is worth noting that historical accounts often vary depending on the source and might not always be entirely accurate. The actual number of soldiers under Wazir Khan’s command was somewhere between these two estimates. Regardless of the exact number, it is clear that the battle was a massive undertaking on both sides and required significant resources and manpower.
As soon as the battle commenced and the elephants came within range of the Sikh cannons, the Sikhs swiftly fired upon them, causing the elephants to retreat in pain, unintentionally injuring their soldiers. In response, the Sirhind army also began firing cannons. The Sikh armies found cover behind fortifications near the Jhiri forest, and their cannons effectively replied to the Sirhind cannons. Many Mughal soldiers were killed in the initial hours, causing the shooting from the Mughal side to cease. A significant number of Sikh cavalry soldiers broke into the Sirhind army, resulting in intense fighting and casualties. The Sikh soldiers demonstrated unparalleled courage and fought fiercely alongside the highly skilled Khalsa army, continuing a tradition established by Guru Nanak’s ideology, which ingrained in Sikh culture for two hundred years, inspired them to lay down their lives for the sake of truth.
Shortly after that, Wazir Khan met his demise, and the soldiers of the formidable army of the world’s most powerful empire began scattering from the battlefield in a bid to preserve their lives, resulting in casualties among their ranks as they attempted to flee. Ganda Mal, the nephew of Suchanand, attempted to run away with his Hindu soldiers but was intercepted and ultimately killed by the Sikh forces. Banda Singh Bahadar descended from the hill and joined the battle himself, elevating the morale of the Sikh soldiers, who fiercely assaulted the Sirhind soldiers with unprecedented enthusiasm. The fierce fighting terrified the Mughal soldiers.
The first encounter was between Baaj Singh and Suchanand, who, like a coward, fled straight to Sirhind without stopping along the way. Baaj Singh and Fateh Singh then moved towards Wazir Khan, with Fateh Singh overpowering Wazir’s elephant, leading to his demise in the ensuing hand-to-hand combat. Sher Muhammad Khan of Malerkotla, who had come to fight at Chappar Chiri, was also killed by the Sikh soldiers(Irvine, Ibid. According to Irvine, Sher Mohammed Khan was killed before Wazir Khan died. Malerkotla’s family believes that he did not die in this battle.). His brother, Khwaja Ali, also perished, and no Mughal or Pathan soldier dared to remain on the battlefield any longer. Some fled, while others surrendered to the Sikhs, who captured the Mughal weapons and forgave them(Khafi Khan, op.cit., page 654). This battle lasted only a few hours, from morning until noon on 12th May 1710 AD (Ibid.).
The Battle of Chappar Chiri proved to be a crucial moment in Sikh history as it marked the Khalsa triumph over the Mughal empire and paved the way for establishing a Sikh state. General Banda Singh Bahadar’s strategic brilliance and prowess in the battle were a testament to the courage and unwavering spirit of the Khalsa soldiers, resulting in a memorable and motivational chapter in Sikh history.
The Capture of Sirhind
After the Battle of Chappar Chiri, the wounded Sikh soldiers received medical attention, and the fallen Sikh warriors were given a collective funeral. During the cremation, the Sikh soldiers continuously chanted hymns, demonstrating their unwavering devotion. Following the funeral, the Sikh army marched towards Sirhind and arrived at the city gates in the middle of the night after covering a distance of twenty miles.
As the city gates were closed, the Sikhs laid siege to Sirhind. The next day, after a brief encounter, the Sikh soldiers successfully entered the city. They took a procession with the corpse of Wazir Khan and hung it upside down from a tree within the fort. The sight of birds of prey feasting on the rotting corpse created fear among the people of Sirhind, who then pleaded for mercy from the Sikh soldiers. The city was filled with silence and fear, but the Sikhs assured the people that innocent individuals would not be treated unfairly.
The Sikhs then advanced towards the fort, where they suffered losses from cannon fire. However, some Sikhs climbed a nearby hillock and successfully eliminated the soldiers using the cannons. With the aid of their advanced Sikh cannons, which outmatched the Mughal cannons, the Sikhs managed to penetrate the fort. A few remaining soldiers in the fort surrendered and were taken into custody by Banda Singh Bahadar.
With no one left to resist them in the city or the fort, the Sikhs took control over Sirhind. Samund Khan, the son of Wazir Khan, had already fled to Delhi with substantial wealth. However, Suchanand, who had initially escaped Chappar Chiri, was hiding in Sirhind. He was eventually captured and executed for his crimes. Sucha Nand had hoarded immense wealth confiscated and deposited in the Sikh treasury. Mohammed Qasim writes: ‘It seems that he had collected all this wealth for this day… People said that there was no form of injustice that Wazir Khan had not perpetrated on the poor people, and, now, there was no seed of cruelty which did not sprout; as he sowed, so did he reap (Ibratnama, pages 133-46 of the printed book; 26B to 35B of the manuscript at British Library, London).’ The Sikh army sentenced all the criminals guilty to death (Tarikh-i-Mohammed Shahi). The paradise-like mansions of Sucha Nand and Wazir Khan became playgrounds for the crows (Mohammed Qasim)( ibid.).
In the evening, General Banda Singh Bahadar convened a meeting with prominent citizens of Sirhind. He declared that while no innocent person would be oppressed, criminals would not be allowed to escape. This declaration relieved the people of Sirhind, with many seeking a peaceful resolution with Banda Singh Bahadar.
Accurate Date of Chappar Chiri Battle
The Battle of Chappar Chiri took place on 12th May 1710 AD, with the city of Sirhind and the fort being captured the next day. The news of the Sikh army’s triumph reached emperor Bahadur Shah in the city of Bahasu on 20th May 1710 AD.
Inaccuracies regarding the date of the battle have been mentioned in some publications, including a book titled “Later Mughals” by the British author Irvin[1]. Irvin mistakenly cited an undated entry in Akbharat-i-Darbar-i-Mu’alla as evidence for a different date of the battle, which is not authentic (An undated entry of Akhbarat-i-Darbar-i-Mu’alla, after the report dated 13th February, 1712 AD.)
It seems that he had relied on an undated entry of Akbharat-i-Darbar-i-Mu’alla, which was written as a commentary and is not a daily diary of the Mughal court. It seems that the translator had erred in converting the date from Hijri to Julian/Gregorian calendar. On the other hand, as per an entry of Akbharat-i-Darbar-i-Mu’alla, the report of this battle was given to Bahadur Shah on 20th May 1710 AD when he was at Bahasu(Entry of Akhbarat-i-Darbar-i-Mualla, dated May 20, 1710 AD.). It took this news eight days to reach him (he could not have the report two days before the battle). So, 12th May 1710 AD is the correct date. However, the news of the battle reached the emperor in eight days, confirming that the battle indeed took place on 12th May 1710 AD. In 19th century camouflage, Sikh historians have concocted dates and stories on the Battle of Sirhind at the instigation of the Britishers (It is interesting that Santokh Singh (in Suraj Prakash Granth) wrote that the battle of Sirhind was fought in 1707 AD when the Guru was still alive. According to him, on hearing the news, Guru became ‘happy’. Another writer, Giani Gian Singh, who borrowed information from Santokh Singh (Gur Parap Suraj) and Ratan Singh (Prachin Panth Parkash), too mentions the date of this battle as Jeth 1764 Bikrami (May 1707 AD.). These people are culprits in destroying Sikh history at the instigation of the British.).
Mystery Behind Wazir Khan’s Death
According to various accounts, the demise of Wazir Khan (According to Irvine, Wazir Khan was then 80 years old: Later Mughals, Vol. 1, page 96) during the Battle of Chappar Chiri is described differently. Khafi Khan reports that Wazir Khan was shot and killed by a bullet (Khafi Khan, Muntakhab-ul-Lubab, page 653; Irvine, Later Mughals, vol. 1, page 96; Elliot and Dowson, History of India as Told By Its Historians, vol.7, page 414), and Kanhaiya Lal confirms this claim (Tarikh-i-Punjab, page 59). However, the Latif in Lareekh-i-Punjab suggests that an arrow killed Wazir Khan (Ikram Ali Malik, History of the Punjab, page 274). Mir Muhammad Ahsan Ijad recounts that during the battle, Wazir Khan advanced on Banda Singh Bahadar, but Baaj Singh intervened, resulting in Wazir Khan shooting a spear at Baaj Singh. The latter retaliated by shooting it back, hitting Wazir Khan’s horse. In the ensuing melee, Wazir Khan attacked Baaj Singh with his sword, but Fateh Singh intervened, severing Wazir Khan’s right arm. With Wazir Khan’s defeat, the remaining soldiers of his army fled. Yar Mohammed, in Dastur-ul-Insha, writes: “Wazir Khan’s head was hung on a spear, and his trunk was dragged behind a cart up to Sirhind”. Legend has it that Wazir Khan had inflicted great suffering on the people, and his death was described as gruesome. Muhammad Kasim adds that the opulent palaces of Sucha Nand and Wazir Khan were reduced to abandoned ruins.
Fatalities In the Battle
After the battle, a Sikh unit took on the responsibility of tending to the fallen martyrs. It is widely believed that a significant number of Sikhs were martyred, while approximately 20,000 Mughal soldiers met their demise. Bajar Singh, known for training Guru Gobind Singh in weaponry, was among those who made the ultimate sacrifice. The battle resulted in a considerable number of Sikhs martyred or wounded. Additionally, the victorious Sikhs seized 45 cannons, numerous elephants, hundreds of horses, and a substantial quantity of firearms.
On 20th May 1710 AD, emperor Bahadur Shah, who was stationed in Ajmer at the time, received a report detailing the achievements of General Banda Singh Bahadar (Akhbarat-i-Darbar-i-Mu’alla, 20 May 1710 AD). On 24th May 1710 AD, a battle took place in Ramdaspur (Amritsar), where the Sikhs of the Khalsa emerged victorious. The force sent from Lahore to engage them failed to gain control of the situation (Ibratnama, in Sikh History from Persian Sources, page 118. Akhbarat-i Darbar-i Mu’alla. In Sikh History from Persian Sources, Irfan Habib pages 107-8.).
Banda Singh Bahadar’s early accomplishments were documented by the contemporary Persian historian Khafi Khan, who observed, “In the span of three or four months, he assembled around him four or five thousand cavalry and seven or eight thousand diverse foot soldiers. His ranks swelled daily, and he accumulated substantial plunder, eventually commanding an army of eighteen or nineteen thousand troops engaged in warfare (Khafi Khan, Muntakhab-al Lubab, Eng Trans, Elliot and Dowson in History of India as told by its own Historians Vol. 7, page 294.).” The Banjara, adept in land and sea trade, were renowned globally for their expertise in horse trading and the exchange of saltpetre. They were highly sought after as reputable horse traders by various groups and individuals searching for buying or selling horses. The Banjara horse traders were distinguished for their knowledge of horse breeds, ability to evaluate a horse’s health and attributes, and skill in negotiating fair transactions. Their reputation as proficient horse traders often made them the preferred choice in the market. The significant number of cavalries in the Sikh forces was not a spur-of-the-moment decision but a meticulously planned preparation. A substantial number of financial resources were required to acquire war horses, which had been amassed well before by the Sikhs at the commencement of the war. Historians have often misunderstood and misinterpreted the Sikh war against the Mughals as a mere peasant revolt. The rapid movement of Sikh forces was made possible by their well-trained cavalry. A well-trained cavalry force cannot be assembled suddenly; it requires careful preparation and training. This also demonstrates the extensive war preparations made by the Sikhs.
Bahadur Shah’s Orders to the Provincial Heads of Delhi and Lahore
In 1710 AD, the Sikh movement spread rapidly, and the Mughal empire was experiencing an upsurge of Sikh resistance. When Bahadur Shah, the Mughal emperor, heard the news of Wazir Khan’s death and the capture of Sirhind, he grew concerned about the rising power of the Sikhs. Therefore, he ordered the subedars of Lahore and Delhi to take action to suppress the rebellion (Akhbarat-i-Darbar-i-Mu’alla, May 20, 1710 AD).
Bahadur Shah’s orders were clear: use all available force to crush the Sikh uprising. The subedar of Lahore ordered his men to attack the Sikhs and capture their leaders. Meanwhile, the subedar of Delhi dispatched troops to the Punjab region to crush the Sikh rebellion.
Despite these orders, the Sikh resistance continued. The Sikh forces were skilled fighters who used guerrilla warfare tactics to evade and attack the Mughal forces. Internal conflicts, weak leadership, and a lack of resources hampered the Mughal forces. As a result, the Mughal empire launched several military campaigns against the Sikhs over subsequent months. However, despite their efforts, the Sikhs held their ground and continued to strengthen their forces.
Battle of Rahon
In July 1710 AD, the initial skirmish involving the Mughals under Shamas Khan and Sikhs occurred at Rahon (near Hoshiarpur hills)( H. Reveridge, The Maathir-ul-umara, vol. 2, tr., Delhi 1999, pages 552-55.). The Sikh forces, under General Bhagwant Singh Bangeshwari, fought this battle. The Sikh movement was against the beneficiaries of the existing authority structure. The Sikhs issued orders to chaudhries, muqaddams and qanungos of Rahon, and the adjacent parganas, calling upon them to surrender.
The Sikhs, bolstered by their logistic preparations for war, were capable enough to confront the faujdar of Jalandhar directly. Sikhs sent a parwana, or official letter, to Shamas Khan, faujdar of Bist Jullandhar Doab , to surrender alongside the entire treasury. Shamas Khan swore an oath of loyalty to them, using the Quran as proof. However, to postpone the confrontation, he used the time to plan his military strategy, and he gave the Sikh messengers a vague response.
After some time, Shamas Khan made an interesting move in an attempt to sow fear and apprehension among the Sikh forces. He sent a small quantity of gunpowder to the Sikhs and a message that the Mughal army had a much larger stock of gunpowder, which they intended to use against the Sikhs. However, this move had the opposite effect to what Shamas Khan intended. The Sikhs demonstrated their ingenuity by recognizing this as an effort to undermine them. They had previously acquired knowledge about the Mughal armoury. In preparation for potential conflict, the Sikhs established their armoury near Garhshankar during the time of the Guru sahibans. Their stockpile of gunpowder was much larger than that of the Mughals. They were well-prepared for any eventuality and had their strategies and tactics in place. Moreover, it also demonstrated their commitment to their cause and willingness to stand up to the Mughal empire, despite their overwhelming military power. Overall, Shamas Khan’s move to send gunpowder to the Sikhs proved futile, rather counterproductive. It only served to strengthen the resolve of the Sikh forces and motivated them to fight even harder.
Shamas Khan(The faujdar of Bist Jullundur Doab was Shamas Khan, a Khalafzai Pathan, hailing from Kasur. He was the only son of Peer Khan, whose father, Sultan Ahmad Khan Khalafzai, had provided outstanding service to Prince Muhammad Azam. Under Bahadur Shah, Peer Khan held a high rank. After his death, his son Nur Khan, also known as Shamas Khan or Shamas-ud-Din Khan, was appointed as the faujdar of Doaba Bist Jullundur with its capital at Sultanpur, in recognition of his meritorious service), the faujdar of sarkar Jalandhar doab, accumulated a sizeable Mughal force to attack Rahon. In July 1710 AD, Shamas Khan raised a war cry against the Sikhs, calling it Jihad. He gathered many Mughals soldiers from Lahore suba. Shamas Khan had four to five thousand cavalry and 30,000 armed forces; the rest were newly recruited soldiers. The Mughal forces were defeated in the battle and retreated within two days. The Sikh forces’ preparations in the Rahon region were so intense that the Mughals could not counter them effectively. To evaluate the preparations for the Sikh war in this region, it is essential to consider the historical context of Rahon and its connection to this area for the past two centuries.
Rahon is an old city that overlooks the low valley of the Sutlej near the Shivalik hill; most of the land is under rich forest cover. Towns named Dasuya, Tanda Urmur, Hoshiarpur, Garhshankar, Bajwara, Nawanshahr and Rahon, situated between River Ravi and Sutlej, held social, economic, and political significance during various periods of history. In the time of Ibrahim Lodhi (1517-1526 AD), Rahon had a population of 1,45,000 and was a flourishing trading centre on the route to Tibet and Central Asia. It remained a pargana during Mughal times(Punjab District Gazetteers: Jullundur. Origin the University of California: Controller of Print. and Stationery. 1981. pages 502, 227.). Guru Nanak sahib visited this place during his travels to Dasuya, Hoshiarpur, Garhshankar and Kiratpur hills.( There are a number of Gurdwaras in this region, marking the visit of Guru Nanak sahib.) He marked places in this region to establish forts of Halimi Raj, and since then, this region has become the home of Banjara Sikhs and Sufi saints. Tanda Mangli, Tanda Kushal Singh, Tanda Jal and Tanda Khalian, in the vicinity of Rahon, indicate Banjara Sikh settlements and extensive trade activities in this region. In another important historical war between Hemu and Akbar, in 1556 AD, the widow of Hemu Banjara came to Bajwara Jungles for safe asylum and brought elephants laden with gold and treasures(There are a number of Gurdwaras in this region, marking the visit of Guru Nanak sahib.
As per new research, Hemu Banjara was a gunpowder and arms trader who gradually raised his army to uproot the Mughal empire led by Akbar. Hemu had also embraced the Sikh faith like other Banjara leaders. This region was a safe zone against the Mughals due to its geographical location and large Sikh settlements were established in the suba Lahore in the towns of Jahangirabad, Wazirabad, Ibrahimabad, Sodhra, Rahon, Phillaur, Nur Mahal, Dera Baba Nanak, TarnTaran , Amritsar, Hargobindpur, Anandpur, Kiratpur, Kartarpur and even in Hoshiarpur, which and flourished in late 16th -17th century(Ganesh Das Vadehra, Char Bagh-i-Punjab, (English by JS Grewal and Indu Bangu)). Consequently, the wife deemed this location secure for taking refuge.
In 1624 AD , Guru Hargobind sahib shifted his headquarters to Kiratpur and his son, Bhai Gurditta, played a significant role in establishing Sikh forts and settlements in this region. After that, in 1658 AD, Guru Har Rai sahib, also remained in his region. Gurdwara Manji sahib is situated in District Nawanshahr, where Guru Tegh Bahadar sahib came here viaAmritsar- Tarntaran- Khadur- Goindwal- Sultanpur- Kartarpur- Jalandhar- Falah i-Phagwara – Banga route, along with Mata Gujari, Mata Nanaki, Bhai Kirpal Chand and Bhai Makhan Shah Lubana on Dharam Parchar Yatra in 1665 AD .
Several Sikh forts by the name of Lohgarh (near Garhi Maha Singh), Akalgarh, Boothgarh, Gaunsgarh, Dharm Kot, Kot Rangha, Garh Padhana , Begampur, Amargarh, Chak Guru, Chak Mai Das(Bhai Mai Das Banjara was the father of Bhai Mani Singh, and he was the owner of Bangeshwari Tanda), Fatehgarh (Sudha Majra), Garhi Ajitgarh, Garhi Bharti, Jamaitgarh, Jagatpura Theh, Kathgarh, Kaulgarh, Nagal Chhangra, Nagli, Nagal Jattan, Ramgarh, Rurki Kalan, Dameshgarh, Talwandi Fattu, Talwandi Shibu, Talwandi Jattan, Tandawal, Takhtgarh etc were constructed in the region. There were many more Sikhs forts in this region, and most of them were destroyed during the British era; only the Burj of some of the forts was left to keep one chowkidar fixed on the Sikh movement(JAL Montgomery, Final Report of Revised Settlement, Hoshiarpur District, 1879-84,1885 AD, page 24.). The Banjara Sikhs made this region an essential place from the trade perspective. Rahon had Asia’s oldest mandi bazaar, famous for its variety and quality textile products like Bafta, Ghati and Khasa, which were exported to Central Asia(India, Punjab (1862 AD). Report on the Trade and Resources of the Countries of the Northwestern Boundary of India. Original from the University of Minnesota: Government Press, page CCVII.).
The adjoining town, Garh Shankar, was famous for its quality saltpetre (gunpowder) and weapon makers(Imperial Gazetteers of India, page 452). The Banjara /Lubana Sikhs had full control over the gunpowder and arms industry and exported them worldwide. Limestone quarried at Bahrampur near Garh Shankar was also under the control of Sikhs, and it was the most important material required for the construction of forts. Another adjoining town, Bajwara, was an important trade centre for war horses(Studies in Asian History: Proceeding Indian Council for Cultural Relation, page 24 ). In Bajwara Khalsa fort still exists, and pictures are given on the epilogue page. In the 17th century, Rahon was one of the most populated towns in Lahore suba (In 1759AD, Rahon was seized by Dhallewali Confederacy Sikhs, led by Tara Singh Ghaiba. He controlled considerable territory on both sides of the Sutlej River. Rahon, the headquarters, remained in their possession until Tara Singh’s death when it was added to maharajaRanjit Singh‘s dominions. Over time, the city’s population declined significantly, falling to 69,000 when the British took over after the First Anglo-Sikh War in 1846 AD and falling further to 6,607 by 1971AD.).
The Sikh uprising led to the capture of the trade route from Delhi to Lahore by July 1710 AD . They could take control of the route, and no Mughal mansabdar dared to challenge Sikh authority. This significant area was one of the most vital trade routes connecting the East and West, and it had long been under Mughal control. The revenue generated from the Lahore and Delhi subas, which were part of the 22 subas that comprised the Mughal empire, was equal to that of the other 20 subas combined. However, the Sikhs’ control of these subas meant they had effectively seized the vast wealth accumulated in these regions.
Furthermore, Lahore and Delhi were critical regions for the Mughal empire’s international trade activities with Central Asia and Europe. The Sikh revolution caused the Mughals to suffer immense losses in trade activities, significantly weakening the empire’s economy. This was a significant blow to the Mughal empire’s regional power and influence. In addition, the Banjara Sikhs played a substantial role in the Sikh revolution. They had a monopoly on international gunpowder trade and other commodities. They had previously been major suppliers of arms and supplies to the Mughal forces. However, they decided to side with the Sikhs. This not only helped the Sikh forces but also deprived the Mughals of a crucial advantage as a supplier to the Mughal army during the war.
The Sikhs threatened the Mughal empire severely, and the emperor realized he had to lead action. However, the Sikhs had long prepared for their rebellion and had fearless soldiers equipped with superior arms and cavalry. This made them a challenging force to defeat. Moreover, the fall of the Mughal empire was apparent despite being at the height of their power and wealth, with no other empire daring to challenge them.
The Battle of Panipat
In Ahwal-ul-Khawaqin Krit, Muhammad Qasim Aurangabad wrote about the Battle of Panipat, which took place on 29th September 1710 AD, between the Mughal and Sikh forces. The emperor questioned Mahabat Khan, the elder son of Khan-i-Khann Munim Khan and the third Bakshi of Mughal forces.
In 1707 AD, Bahadur Shah defeated the rival contenders to the throne at the Battle of Jajau and bestowed new ranks and titles on his supporters, with Munim Khan appointed as his Khan-i-Khann(Pakistan Quarterly: Volumes 1-9, Pakistan Publications, 1958, page 8) . In July 1710 AD, Mahabat Khan was directed by the emperor to proceed to Punjab, along with the forces of Delhi, to fight Banda Singh Bahadar. Mahabat Khan followed the emperor’s orders and gathered Mughal forces, eventually proceeding to Punjab from Ajmer via Delhi. Upon his arrival in Delhi, Delhi’s subedar provided him with a large Mughal force. Persian historical sources have stated that Mahabat Khan marched to Punjab with an army of 50,000 soldiers.
Banda Singh Bahadar led the rebellion against the Mughal empire and was known for his strategic insight on the battlefield. The key to gaining an advantage over the Mughals was precise information about their movement and plans. To achieve this, Sikhs ad developed a secret information system run by Banjara Sikhs, known for their mobility and ability to navigate through rugged terrain. The Banjara Sikhs set up Tandas, or caravans, that travelled across the region, trading goods and gathering information(Kamraj bin Nain Singh, Ibratnama (1719 AD)). Through their network, they could keep tabs on the movement of the Mughal army, as well as their assets, provisions, and equipment. They would relay this information to Banda Singh Bahadar and his commanders, who would then plan their next move accordingly. This information system was crucial in the Battle of Panipat in September 1710 AD. When Mahabat Khan led his Mughal force to Punjab, Banda Singh Bahadar was aware of his approach and could move his forces to the battle site at Panipat in advance. With the help of the Banjara Sikhs, he was able to outmanoeuvre the Mughals and secure a decisive victory.
Banda Singh Bahadar’s information system was a perfect example of effective intelligence gathering in warfare, which gave him a critical advantage over the Mughals. It showed how he could think before the immediate battle and plan his tactics based on knowledge and information gained through a network.
When Mahabat Khan’s expedition came to the notice of Sikh forces, Banda Singh Bahadar decided to intercept them at Panipat. At this time, Banda Singh Bahadar was at the Gangetic doab, near Bareilly, and he reached Panipat immediately. Large Sikh settlements and forts in villages named Begampura Bapnot, Dharmgarh, Lohari, Faridpur, Kheri Nagal, Bholi, Lohari, Munak, Faridpur, Nagla Paar, Mohali, Pathargarh, Garh Sanrai, and Garhi Bhalal, were established around Panipat since the time of Guru Nanak sahib along with Sufi Pirs of Panipat came in support of Sikh forces in this battle.
In September 1710 AD, when a large Mughal force came to Panipat well-equipped. The Sikh forces in thousands intercepted the Mughal forces at Panipat under the leadership of General Banda Singh Bahadar. The battle lasted for two days, and Mughal forces suffered significant losses. Finally, Mahabat Khan retreated to Delhi along with his leftover troops. The pickets and posts of Sikhs remained as they were. Even though this battle was much larger than the three famous battles of Panipat, which were widely reported in history, this battle mainly went unnoticed and remained unreported in history; probably, the Mughals and later the British never wanted that to happen!
Meanwhile, the emperor decided to lead an expedition against the Sikhs. The emperor himself travelled to the Sikh state capital of Lohgarh to capture General Banda Singh Bahadar. However, the only path available was the Delhi-Lahore trade route, which was already under the Sikhs’ control. Mahabat Khan and Feroz Shah Mewati were sent to clear the way for the emperor, highlighting the Mughal empire’s desperation to reclaim control. The Sikh uprising severely threatened the once-mighty Mughal empire, and this incident marked a turning point in the region’s history.
Until the end of September 1710 AD, the Mughals had not achieved any significant success in clearing the trade route. With the emperor himself en route to Lohgarh, it became imperative to succeed in October 1710 AD. A large army was thus deployed exclusively to clear the route, and some progress was made on this front. The trade route up to Karnal was removed after several battles between the Mughals and Sikhs. Later, in August 1710 AD, the Pirs of the Qalandari chapter in Karnal issued a Fatwa declaring a Holy war (Jihad) against the Sikhs(According to the Persian document , Dastur-ul-Insha (Eye Witness of the Events) (1710-1711AD) by Yar Mohmmad Khan Kalandhar.).
Second Battle of Rahon
On October 11, 1710 AD, another Battle of Rahon was fought between Sikhs and Mughals(TJacques Tony (2007), Dictionary of Battles and Sieges, Greenwood Press, pages 836-837.). During this time, General Banda Singh Bahadar was in the Gangetic doab, near Bareilly, and was keeping a keen eye on the movement of the Mughal emperor. At Rahon, Sikh forces were fighting under the leadership of General Bhagwant Singh Bangeshwari. When Shamas Khan’s army arrived at Rahon, they were met with a formidable Sikh force inside the fort and nearby forts as well. General Banda Singh Bahadar also received the news of this attack. The Sikhs wasted no time and launched an attack on Shamas Khan’s army outside the town’s walls. The battle was intense, with the Sikhs putting up a fierce fight that made Shamas Khan consider fleeing or surrendering. However, at that time, Shamas Khan’s uncle, Bayzid Khan (also known as Qutub-ud-Din Khaishgi), the faujdar of Jammu, arrived with a large force. Around the same time, Umar Khan, the chief of Kasur, and his soldiers also joined the battle. A massive Mughal army consisting of nearly 50000 soldiers surrounded Rahon and initiated a siege from all sides. This reinforced the Mughal forces and compelled the Sikhs to retreat and seek refuge near the Khalsa fort.
Although it appeared that the Sikhs had vacated the fort of Rahon, they had, in fact, taken refuge in the Khalsa forts located nearby. At dawn, the Sikh forces made their move and launched a sudden assault on the Mughal garrisons of Shamas Khan at Rahon fort. The Sikhs were successful in expelling the Mughal soldiers from the fort. By concealing themselves in the nearby Khalsa forts and attacking the garrison with courage, the Sikhs proved that their tactics were not only effective but also successful in securing their objectives. Sikhs widely used unique war strategies in their battles against the Mughals. However, this tactic is often misunderstood and perceived as a sign of defeat. But their trickery and pretended retreats deceived enemies, who would often follow them in pursuit, only to be ambushed and defeated by the Sikhs. Such experiences prompted qazi Nur Mohammad Gunjabavi, the author of Jangnamah, to caution his fellow co-religionists against this tactic of the Sikhs.
‘When their armies fall, do not see it as defeat,
Oh young ones, for it is but a tactic they repeat.
Beware, beware, the Sikhs’ strategy of war,
As in revenge, it transforms defeat into victory galore.
Their enemies who pursue are cut off from behind,
Then the Sikhs turn, leaving their chasers far behind.
It does not matter if the pursuers are strong or elite,
For the Sikhs will set their water on fire and retreat.
Did you not witness how they feigned retreat in battle?
And then they drew a cordon around Shamas Khan
and enclosed him in such a manner as if he were taken in a circle.’
Mughal nobles and the writer of this incident failed to understand the strategies of Sikh forces. Their tactics and triumphs in warfare were not instantaneous; rather, they resulted from extensive preparations since the days of Guru Nanak sahib.
This battle raged for three days, sustaining heavy losses on both sides. Eventually, the Mughals were depleted of their ammunition and supplies, and they found themselves under attack from Sikh forces, both inside the Rahon fort and outside from the Khalsa forts placed in the nearby sub-mountainous area situated near the Shivalik Hills under dense forest cover .
The Mughals also became vulnerable to guerrilla attacks from the Sikhs, and they had no answer to these war tactics and under these hostile conditions and Sikh preparations, the Shamas Khan and his army eventually decided to retreat. During their attempted escape, many Mughal soldiers were killed, and only a few managed to survive.
Despite their withdrawal, Shamas Khan and Bayzid Khan gained recognition and enhanced their prestige in the eyes of the emperor. They resolved to attack Sirhind and, to move forward, crossed the Sutlej River at Machhiwara(Akhbarat-i-Darbar-i-Mu’alla, entry of 15.10. 1710 AD.). They spent a night in the Pakki Sarai, preparing themselves for the impending battle against the Sikhs in Sirhind. Up to now, practically the whole of the Bist Jullundur Doab came under the sway of the Sikhs. Shama Khan himself was not allowed to remain at Sultanpur, and according to the Maasir-ul-Umra, 22 battles were fought between the Sikhs and him.
Battle Of Taraori and Khera Amin
In February 1710 AD, General Banda Singh Bahadar proceeded towards Taraori-Azamabad (now known as Taraori) to capture its formidable fort. Sayyid Mohammad Ashraf, the grandfather of Pir Budhu Shah of Sadhaura, a descendant of Shah Abdul Wahab, built this fort(). This fort was constructed during the regime of Shah Jahan(Subhash Parihar, Land Transportation in Mughal India, Agra-Lahore Mughal Highway and its Architectural Remains, page 181. The author noticed the presence of a verandah, preceding nave and aisle, in two more mosques, namely the Mosque of Shah Wahab at Sadhaura and the mosque at Bahrampur (District Gurdaspur), both built in the regime of Aurangzeb). The family of Pir Budhu Shah owned a jagir in this region.
Bhai Jaita undertook the task of bringing the beheaded head of the ninth Guru from Delhi to Anandpur after the martyrdom of Guru Tegh Bahadar sahib in 1675 AD. During this five-day journey, Bhai Jaita stayed at the fort of Taraori during the night. Bhai Jatia chose to stay only at secure places from a Sikh perspective. Many Sufi Pirs gathered secretly at this fort to express their remorse against emperor Aurangzeb, as they were unhappy with his policies and actions. This clandestine meeting allowed them to discuss their concerns against the atrocities of Mughal authorities and to make potential opposition or resistance without drawing unwanted attention. The presence of Gurdwara Sishganj , adjacent to the Taraori fort, is evidence of this significant event. Other Khalsa forts were also established near this fort at Shamgarh , Amargarh, Raison, Rajgarh, Sikri, Sagha, Sherpur and Kaul. Some of these forts are interconnected through the underground tunnels. Large Sikh settlements were established in the region right from the time of Guru Nanak sahib, and Sufi pir of Mecca, Egypt and Baghdad also settled in the early 16th century.
Taraori is five kilometres from Khera Amin and 15 kilometres from Thanesar city, now known as Kurukshetra. There is substantial evidence suggesting that all 10 of the revered Sikh Guru sahibans indeed visited Thanesar and its surrounding regions. These visits are essential in establishing forts and Halimi Raj in this region. Between the early 16th and late 17th centuries, Sikhs established numerous forts between Taraori and Amin, including Shangaol, Tikhana Khalsa, Barani Khalsa, Raipur, Tikri Khalsa, Sanheri Khalsa, Sagha, Abli Khalsa, and Narayana, among others. Banda Singh Bahadar utilized these forts in the 18th century to resist the Mughals. In Khera Amin, the Sikhs constructed a substantial fort equipped with provisions and armaments to confront the Mughal forces. The area was characterized by dense forest cover, rough terrain, and abundant water sources, providing ample support for the Sikh army. Large ponds and wells were present to cater to their daily needs. The Mughal army, hindered by logistical challenges, could not advance beyond Karnal and faced repeated substantial losses in their encounters with the Sikhs.
On October 16, 1710 AD, a critically important battle occurred at Khera Amin, the site of a confrontation between the Mughal and Sikh forces. The Mughal troops were led by Feroz Khan Mewati and Mahabat Khan, who commanded an armed contingent of 60,000 soldiers deployed by emperor Bahadur Shah. They launched an attack on the Sikh forces that were stationed at the fort Khera Amin, which is located near Kurukshetra, at a distance of 24 kilometres from Karnal. The Sikh forces were also numerically strong, with thousands of Sikh soldiers fighting under the command of General Kirat Singh. This conflict was an intense and brutal confrontation between two powerful military forces.
On one side, the Mughals were losing their grip over the region due to the uprising of the Sikhs, who were growing increasingly powerful. On the other hand, the Sikhs were keen to establish their authority over the region and were determined not to let the Mughal emperor easily reach the Lohgarh zone. This battle featured a range of military tactics and weaponry, including the deployment of firearms, sharp-edged weaponry, and mounted cavalry. The Mughals deployed their vast army to overpower the Sikhs but were met with fierce resistance. The Sikhs could also use their superior knowledge of the land to their advantage, and their fighting spirit was unyielding.
According to the Persian document Dastur-ul-Insha (Eye Witness Of The Events) (1710-1711 AD) by Yar Mohmmad Khan Kalandhar, Sultan Kulli Khan commanded Feroz Khan Mewati and Shikar Khan to launch an assault on the Sikhs at Panipat and Khera Amin in October 1710 AD. The document also highlights that the Sikh army had appointed an administrator in Thanesar, with many Hindus and Muslims in suba Delhi converting to the Sikh faith. Those who sought assistance from General Banda Singh Bahadar were referred to as ‘Singh’ (meaning emperor). Shah Safi Qalandar of Karnal and his followers decided to assist the Mughal forces in the fierce Battle of Khera Amin. Shah Sufi Qalandar was known as a religious teacher to Sultan Kulli Khan. The confrontation between the Mughals and Sikhs in the Battle of Khera Amin resulted in a grim scene, with piles of dead bodies of Mughal soldiers stretching as far as the eye could see. The surrounding forests were also filled with the remains of fallen soldiers. The number of wounded soldiers was so great that it was impossible to count them all. The devastating state of the battlefield left Feroz Khan Mewati and Mahabat Khan in a state of shock.
Furthermore, the followers of the Mughals were in a dire situation, fearing for the safety of their religion. Fuelled by rage after the defeat, Feroz Khan Mewati personally led his forces to launch a fierce attack against the Sikhs. The battle was ferocious, with the Mughal forces facing repeated defeats and pushed to the brink of retreat, considering heading back to Delhi. Amid this critical situation, Shah Sufi Qalandar and his disciples joined the Mughal forces at Kheri Amin and declared jihad the holy war. The Sikh army, led by General Bhai Kirat Singh Bakshi, inflicted heavy casualties on the Mughal troops. However, Sikh General Kirat Singh attained martyrdom. While the Mughals succeeded in eliminating Sikh resistance from Khera Amin dispute, the casualties suffered by Mughal soldiers were exceptionally high.
The retreat of the Sikh forces to the nearby advance of Lohgarh’s forts resulted from fierce battles, heavy losses, and a calculated strategic move. The geographic conditions of the Lohgarh zone posed challenges for the formidable Mughal army, as the rugged terrain and dense wilderness were natural obstacles hindering their movements. Recognizing this disadvantage, the Sikh forces strategically utilized the terrain to plan their manoeuvres. Retreating to the fortified stronghold of Lohgarh enabled the Sikhs to regroup and fortify their defences, making it arduous for the Mughal forces to launch effective offensives against them.
Moreover, this move had another advantage as to get time to prepare a more prolonged resistance against the Mughal forces. The Sikh leaders also knew that they could harass Mughal armies with their hit-and-run tactics and surprise attacks, making it difficult to maintain a firm grip over the region. By using such tactics, the Sikhs could force the Mughal forces to fight the battles on their terms. Thus, the Sikh strategy of retreating to the Lohgarh zone was a well-thought-out plan to make it difficult for the Mughal forces to get a grip over the region, regroup and launch a more scathing attack.
On 2nd October, 1710 AD Bahadur Shah received news that Firoz Khan Mewati was nearing Karnal and was expected to launch an attack on Sirhind soon(Akhbarat-i-Darbar-i-Mu’alla, entry of 2.10.1710 AD). On 12th October, Bahadur Shah was informed that Firoz Khan had established his post at Taraori, approximately 20 kilometres from Karnal, and the Sikh had fled. On October 14, Bahadur Shah learned that a battle had taken place between Jalal Khan Ruhila and the Sikhs, which resulted in the death of 3000 royal soldiers and the victory of the Mughal army in the region of Taraori (Akhbarat-i-Darbar-i-Mu’alla, entry of 10.10.1710 AD). When the emperor got this news on 20th October, 1710 AD he bestowed precious gifts on Firoz Khan Mewati. It included one hundred thousand rupees and the governorship of Sirhind (Zain-ud-Din Ahmad Khan was removed from the governorship) ( Akhbarat-i-Darbar-i-Mu’alla, entry of 10.10.1710 AD).
Rustam Dil Khan conveyed the news of the triumph of Firoz Khan Mewati in Amingarh on 26th October, where they achieved victory over the Sikhs and presented 300 heads as proof. Near Thanesar town, Sikhs built a minaret (Jung-e-Satoone), on which was inscribed a symbol, depicting the establishment of Khalsa Raj and the stamp of a region belonging to the Khalsa capital of Lohgarh. On seeing this, Mewati impulsively attacked Sikhs twice. In October, 1710 AD many fierce battles fought at Taraori, Amingarh (Khera Amin) and Thanesar between the two sides.
Sikhs were attacking Mughals time and again, which led to heavy losses of Mughal forces. Yar Mohmmad Khan Kalandhar, witness to the events, writes that Lohgarh was 10-15 kilometres from Khera Amin, and the Sikh forces used to take refuge in other Sikh forts after the attacks. The writer has some truth in it, as there were 52 advance forts of Lohgarh fort spread from Karnal to Chandigarh. This battleground is part of the Lohgarh zone. As Mughal forces did not have a map of the Lohgarh zone and its fortifications, the writer could be wrong in providing specific details of the area.
In an attempt to recapture the Mughal sarkar and pargana from the Sikhs, the Mughal forces launched parallel attacks on the Sikh forces in suba Lahore and Delhi. Shamas Khan led the Mughal army at Sirhind on 2th November, 1710 AD when Sikh general Bhai Baaj Singh was near Lahore. The Sikh forces, led by Sukha Singh Bangeshwari and Bhai Sham Singh, bravely confronted the Mughal army and fought against Shamas Khan and Bazeed Khan. Unfortunately, many Sikh soldiers lost their lives in these battles, including General Bhai Sukha Singh. After his martyrdom, the Sikh forces retreated and sought refuge in the Sirhind fort. Today, to commemorate the martyrdom of Bhai Sukha Singh and other Sikh soldiers who lost their lives in this battle, the impressive Shahid-i-Ganj gurdwara stands at the site near the Gurdwara Fatehgarh.
Upon witnessing the arrival of a large Mughal army, the Sikh army strategically decided to abandon the Sirhind fort under the cover of darkness on 24th November, 1710 AD . They relocated to the Sikh forts at Manouli and Burail. While pursuing the Sikhs, the army of Mohammad Amin Khan suffered significant losses. After the capture of Sirhind, Shamas Khan sent four bullock carts carrying four emblems, the heads of beheaded Sikhs, to the emperor on 25th November. The emperor rewarded Shamas Khan with a silk raiment as a token of joy and appreciation. Mohammad Amin Khan, however, felt deeply hurt by this honour bestowed upon Shamas Khan. He had desired the same recognition for himself and soon developed a raging jealousy towards Shamas Khan. It turned him into an adversary of Shamas Khan and sought to undermine him.
Battle of Pasrur
In the latter part of May 1711 AD, following a series of skirmishes with local Muslim rulers, the Sikh armed forces established their military presence in the hilly terrain located close to the town of Pasrur (near Gujranwala, Pakistan). Large Sikh fortifications were built near Pasrur in villages named Manak, Nagal Mirza, Kot Lakha Singh, Gota Fatehgarh, Arki and Gulu Kot. On May 30, Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah authorized designated officials, Mohammed Amin Khan (Chain Bahadur) and Ghazi Khan (Rustam-i-Jang), to undertake a focused mission aimed at crushing the Sikh forces and expelling them from the area.
Upon receiving information about the presence of Sikhs near Pasrur, the officials immediately prepared the troops. They arrived at their destination on the evening of 31st May, 1711 AD, covering a distance of around 100 kilometres in four days. However, they found the Sikhs well-prepared for the attack. The next day witnessed a fierce battle during which Isa Khan, son of Mughal commander Daulat Muin, was wounded along with his elephant. Despite their bravery and determination, the Mughals ultimately recognized the vast difference in troop numbers, logistics, and resources stacked against them. So, they tactically decided to retreat(Ibid., pages 70, 72 &76.).
Battles At Kathua, Parol
A significant number of Sikh forts were situated in Kathua, boasting sizable Sikh forces stationed within. Furthermore, Sikh forces traveling from Kiratpur to Kathua via the Swarghat route encountered Sikh forts along the way, with remnants of these forts still visible today. The array of Sikh forts from Swarghat to Kathua included Jangal fort, Bacchetru fort, Sola Singi fort, a Sikh fort 5 km before Naduan, Mangarh fort, Haripur fort, Jwali fort, Shahpur Kandi, Chak Nanak, Lakhanpur and additional forts in the Kathua vicinity . Upon learning about the Sikh incursion into his territory, hill chief Dhruv Dev of Jammu swiftly assembled his entire army and launched an aggressive assault against them. Similarly, Azmatulla Khan, the chief of Rajouri, mobilized his forces to join in the attack against the Sikhs. With overwhelming opposition from Sikh forces and limited options, the Mughals were compelled to retreat and seek refuge in the region of Sialkot. The Mughal forces failed to reach Jammu and were engaged in battles at Kathua and Parol, suffering considerable casualties.
The Akbharat-i-Darbar-i-Mu’alla documents Banda Singh Bahadar’s assault from Attock towards Bareilly, spanning 600 kilometres. The region near Jammu was significant due to several Khalsa forts constructed at locations such as Kathua, Reasi, Udhampur, Pathankot, Shahpur Kandi, Basohli, Parole, and Rajouri were present there.
In the 16th century, Guru Nanak sahib marked areas for Khalsa fortification and masands were appointed for the spread of Sikhism. Some of the descendants of Pir Dastgir, Pir Jalaludin of Egypt, got settled in the Jammu region from Baghdad on the order of Guru Nanak sahib. In the 17th century, Bhai Gurdas also contributed to the mission of Halimi Raj in this region. In the 18th century, Banda Singh Bahadar with a significant Khalsa army, uprooted Mughals from this region. Banjara Sikhs had established several Tandas in the region, who established numerous Khalsa forts that were utilized against the Mughals.
Jammu is surrounded by the Shivalik hills, with the Trikuta range on the northwest. Khalsa forts such as Pir Mastgarh, Dhergarh, Bhupnegarh, Suchetgarh, Dewangarh, Moharhgarh and Ramgarh are found nearby, with the Tawi River flowing through. Kathua is on the banks of the Ravi, with hills on all sides and several Khalsa forts, including Bahu fort, Chak Nanak, Lakhanpur, Jasmergarh, Mankot, Balu fort and Ramkot.
Reasi town is divided into two regions and surrounded by the Chenab River on three sides, with Bhimagarh, Laddangarh and Patangarh serving as examples of Khalsa forts. Udhampur is primarily mountainous terrain with snowfall in the upper reaches during winter. Rajouri is located in the Pir Panjal range, with Kharji fort, Gulabgarh fort, Dhanidhar fort, Chingus fort, Throtchi fort, Bharand fort, Baral fort, Sangni fort, fort Burjun, Ramkot fort, Mangla fort being nearby.
Basohli has an average elevation of 460 meters and is nestled in the Shivalik mountains with Khalsa forts surrounding it. Pathankot and Shahpur Kandi have additional Khalsa forts utilized by Banda Singh Bahadar during the battle against the Mughals. In 1711 AD, the chiefs of the Jammu hills aided the Sikh forces in establishing a series of military posts, or thanas, in the parganas (administrative divisions) located beyond the Ravi River to the north(Muzaffar Alam, The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India, Awadh and the Punjab, 1707-48, page 157). During the mid-17th century, a significant number of Sikh forts were already established during the visit of Guru Hargobind sahib and Guru Har Rai sahib. These Sikh strongholds included Jasmergarh in Hiranagar, Mankot (also known as Ramkot), Mastgarh in Kathua, Billawar, Mastgarh in Jammu, Kot, Chak Jaralan, Karalot, and various others. These forts served as crucial storage and logistical hubs for Sikh forces, enabling them to stockpile supplies effectively. Additionally, they provided security clearance to Sikh forces embarking on journeys to attack the Attock region. The establishment of these thanas allowed the Sikh forces to expand their presence and exert greater control over the region. These posts served as strategic strongholds from which Sikh fighters could launch attacks on Mughal forces and other enemies. The support of the Jammu hill chiefs was likely motivated by a desire to challenge the Mughal authority and increase their power. It may also have been influenced of religious and cultural ties with the Sikhs, as there were significant populations of both Sikhs and Hindus in the Jammu region. This support from the Jammu hill chiefs was just one example of the complex web of alliances and power dynamics in the region during this period. As various groups vied for control and sought to challenge the Mughal empire, alliances were formed and dissolved, creating shifting patterns of power and influence.
Tragically, as many as 500 Sikh soldiers lost their lives in these confrontations with the Mughals. Despite this loss, it significantly damaged the Mughal army, forcing them to retreat. The significant loss of Mughal soldiers in these battles likely played an important role in their decision to withdraw. These clashes between the Sikhs and the Mughals were part of a larger struggle for power and independence. The Sikh forces, led by charismatic leaders such as Banda Singh Bahadar, were determined to assert their authority and challenge the Mughal rule. Their guerilla warfare tactics and knowledge of the terrain gave them an advantage in these battles. The retreat of the Mughal army from the region was a significant victory for the Sikhs and bolstered their confidence and morale(Ibid., page 175).
The news of these fierce battles reached the Mughal court, accompanied by a rumour that Banda Singh had also perished in one of these clashes. Taking this rumour seriously, the Mughal officials initiated an extensive search among the fallen Sikh bodies in an attempt to locate Banda Singh’s remains. However, their efforts proved fruitless, as they soon realized the information, they had received was inaccurate. Banda Singh was alive, and the news of his demise was erroneous. This sequence of events highlights the challenging and tumultuous nature of the conflict between the Mughal empire and the Sikh forces. It also showcases the resilience and tenacity of the Sikh fighters as they faced formidable adversaries but continued to fight for their cause, even in the face of heavy losses and false reports of their leader’s demise.
On 3rd June, 1711 AD, following the significant losses suffered by the Mughal forces in the last year and a half, the urgent requirement for reinforcement was evident. In light of this, the emperor contacted raja Jai Singh, seeking his assistance in strengthening their forces. However, it was revealed that Mahabat Khan had inquired about the movements of the rajas and the reason for their delay. There were several allegations regarding the intentions of the Rajput chiefs, which had caused skepticism among the Mughal ranks. The emperor was displeased with Mahabat Khan’s handling of the case relating to the rajas and publicly accused him of spoiling affairs associated with them.